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Abstract
Discrete hidden Markov models (HMM) are often applied to malware detection and classifi-
cation problems. However, the continuous analog of discrete HMMs, that is, Gaussian mixture
model-HMMs (GMM-HMM), are rarely considered in the field of cybersecurity. In this paper, we
use GMM-HMMs for malware classification and we compare our results to those obtained using
discrete HMMs. As features, we consider opcode sequences and entropy-based sequences. For our
opcode features, GMM-HMMs produce results that are comparable to those obtained using discrete
HMMs, whereas for our entropy-based features, GMM-HMMs generally improve significantly on
the classification results that we have achieved with discrete HMMs.
1 Introduction
Due to COVID-19, businesses and schools have moved their work online and some consider the
possibility of going online permanently. This trend makes cybersecurity more important than ever
before.
Malicious software, or malware, is designed to steal private information, delete sensitive data
without consent, or otherwise disrupt computer systems. The study of malware has been active for
decades (Milosevic, 2013). Malware detection and classification are fundamental research topics in
malware. Traditionally, signature detection has been the most prevalent method for detecting mal-
ware, but recently, machine learning techniques have proven their worth, especially for dealing with
advanced types of malware. Many machine learning approaches have been applied to the malware
problem, including hidden Markov models (HMM) (Stamp, 2018), k-nearest neighbors (KNN) (Ben
Abdel Ouahab et al., 2020), support vector machines (SVM) (Kruczkowski and Szynkiewicz, 2014),
and a wide variety of neural networking and deep learning techniques (Kalash et al., 2018).
Each machine learning technique has its own advantages and disadvantages. It is not the case
that one technique is best for all circumstances, since there are many different types of malware and
many different features that can be considered. Thus, it is useful to explore different techniques and
algorithms in an effort to extend our knowledge base for effectively dealing with malware. In this
paper, we focus on Gaussian mixture model-hidden Markov models (GMM-HMMs), which can be
viewed as the continuous analog of the ever-popular discrete HMM.
Discrete HMMs are well known for their ability to learn important statistical properties from a
sequence of observations. For a sequence of discrete observations, such as the letters that comprise a
selection of English text, we can train a discrete HMM to determine the parameters of the (discrete)
probability distributions that underlie the training data. However, some observation sequences are
inherently continuous, such as signals extracted from speech. In such cases, a discrete HMM is not
the ideal tool. While we can discretize a continuous signal, there will be some loss of information. As
an alternative to discretization, we can attempt to model the continuous probability density functions
that underlie continuous training data.
Gaussian mixture models (GMM) are probability density functions that are represented by weighted


























and the weight assigned to each, GMMs can effectively model a wide variety of continuous proba-
bility distributions. It is possible to train HMMs to learn the parameters of GMMs, and the resulting
GMM-HMM models are frequently used in speech recognition (Rabiner, 1989; Bansal et al., 2008),
among many other applications.
In the field of cybersecurity, GMMs have been used, for example, as a clustering method for
malware classification (Interrante-Grant and Kaeli, 2018). However, to the best of our knowledge,
GMM-HMMs are not frequently considered in the context of malware detection or classification.
In this paper, we apply GMM-HMMs to the malware classification problem, and we compare our
results to discrete HMMs. Our results indicate that GMM-HMMs applied to continuous data can
yield strong results in the malware domain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss relevant related
work. Chapter 3 provides background on the various models considered, namely, GMMs, HMMs,
and GMM-HMMs, with the emphasis on the latter. Malware classification experiments and results
based on discrete features are discussed in Chapter 4. Since GMM-HMMs are more suitable for
continuous observations, in Chapter 4 we also present a set of malware classification experiments
based on continuous entropy features. We conclude the paper and provide possible directions for
future work in Chapter 5.
2 Related Work
A Gaussian mixture model (GMM) is a probability density model (McLachlan and Peel, 2004) con-
sisting of a weighted sum of multiple Gaussian distributions. The advantage of a Gaussian mixture is
that it can accurately model a variety of probability distributions (Gao et al., 2020). That is, a GMM
enables us to model a much more general distribution, as compared to a single Gaussian. Although
the underlying distribution may not be similar to a Guassian, the combination of several Gaussians
yields a robust model (Alfakih et al., 2020). However, the more Gaussians that comprise a model,
the costly the calculation involving the model.
One example of the use of GMMs is distribution estimation of wave elevation in the field of
oceanography (Gao et al., 2020). GMMs have also been used in the fields of anomaly detection (Chen
and Wu, 2019), and signal mapping (Raitoharju et al., 2020). As another example, in (Qiao et al.,
2019), a GMM is used as a classification method to segment brain lesions. In addition to distribution
estimation, GMMs form the basis for a clustering method in (Gallop, 2006).
As the name suggests, a discrete hidden Markov model (HMM) includes a “hidden” Markov
process and a series of observations that are probabilistically related to the hidden states. An HMM
can be trained based on an observation sequence, and the resulting model can be used to score
other observation sequences. HMMs have found widespread use in signal processing, and HMMs
are particularly popular in the area of speech recognition (Guoning Hu and DeLiang Wang, 2004).
Due to their robustness and the efficiency, HMMs are also widely used in medical areas, such as
sepsis detection (Stanculescu et al., 2014) and human brain studies based on functional magnetic
resonance imaging (Dang et al., 2017). Motion recognition is another area where HMMs play a vital
role; specific examples include recognizing dancing moves (Laraba and Tilmanne, 2016) and 3D
gestures (Truong and Zaharia, 2017).
Gaussian mixture model-HMMs (GMM-HMM) are also widely used in classification problems.
Given the flexibility of GMMs, GMM-HMMs are popular for dealing with complex patterns un-
derlying sequences of observations. For example, Yao et al. (Yao et al., 2020) use GMM-HMMs
to classify network traffic from different protocols. GMM-HMMs have also been used in motion
detection—for complex poses, GMM-HMMs outperform discrete HMMs (Zhang et al., 2020).
3 Background
In this section, we first introduce the learning techniques used in this paper—specifically, we discuss
Gaussian mixture models, HMMs, and GMM-HMMs. We then discuss GMM-HMMs in somewhat
more detail, including various training and parameter selection issues, and we provide an illustrative
example of GMM-HMM training.
2
3.1 Gaussian Mixture Models
As mentioned above, a GMM is a probabilistic model that combines multiple Gaussian distribu-
tions. Mathematically, the probability density function of a GMM is a weighted sum of M Gaussian







where x is a D-dimensional vector and ωi is the weight assigned to the ith Gaussian component, with
the mixture weights summing to one. Here, µi and Σi are the mean and the covariance matrix of
the ith component of the GMM, respectively. Each component of a GMM is a multivariate Gaussian













In this paper, we use the notation in Table 1 to describe a discrete HMM. This notation is essen-
tially the same as that given in (Stamp, 2018). An HMM, which we denote as λ, is defined by the
matrices A, B, and π, and hence we have λ = (A,B,π).
Table 1: Discrete HMM notation
Notation Explanation
T Length of the observation sequence
O Observation sequence, O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1
N Number of states in the model
K Number of distinct observation symbols
Q Distinct states of the Markov process, q0,q1, . . . ,qN−1
V Observable symbols, assumed to be 0,1, . . . ,K−1
π Initial state distribution, 1×N
A State transition probabilities, N×N
B Observation probability matrix, N×K
We denote the elements in row i and column j of A as ai j. The element ai j of the A matrix is
given by
ai j = P(state q j at t +1 | state qi at t).
The (i, j) element of B is denoted in a slightly unusual form as bi( j). In a discrete HMM, row i
of B represents the (discrete) probability distribution of the observation symbols when underlying
Markov process is in (hidden) state i. Specifically, each element of B = {bi( j)} matrix is given by
bi( j) = P(observation j at t | state qi at t).
The HMM formulation can be used to is solve the following three problems (Stamp, 2018).
1. Given an observation sequence O and a model λ of the form λ = (π,A,B), calculate the prob-
ability of the observation sequence. That is, we can score an observation sequence against a
given model.
2. Given a model λ = (π,A,B) and an observation sequence O, find the “best” state sequence,
where best is defined to be the sequence that maximizes the expected number of correct states.
That is, we can uncover the hidden state sequence.
3. Given an observation sequence O, determine a model λ = (A,B,π) that maximizes P(O |λ).
That is, we can train a model for a given observation sequence.
In this research, we are interested in problems 1 and 3. Specifically, we train models, then we
test the resulting models by scoring observation sequences. The solution to problem 2 is of interest
in various NLP applications, for example. For the sake of brevity, we omit the details of training and
scoring with discrete HMMs; see (Stamp, 2018) or (Rabiner, 1989) for more information.
3
3.3 GMM-HMM
The structure of a GMM-HMM is similar to that of a discrete HMM. However, in a GMM-HMM,
the B matrix is much different, since we are dealing with a mixture of (continuous) Gaussian dis-
tributions, rather than the discrete probability distributions a discrete HMM. In a GMM-HMM, the
probability of an observation at a given state is determined by a probability density function that is
defined by a GMM. Specifically, the probability density function of observation Ot when the model










cim = 1 for i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}.
Here, M is the number of Gaussian mixtures components, cim is the mixture coefficient or the weight
of mth Gaussian mixture at state i, while µim and Σim are the mean vector and covariance matrix for












where D is the dimension of each observation. In a GMM-HMM, the A and π matrices are the same
as in a discrete HMM.
The notation for a GMM-HMM is given in Table 2. This is inherently more complex than a
discrete HMM, due to the presence of the M Gaussian distributions. Note that a GMM-HMM is
defined by the 5-tuple
λ = (A,π,c,µ,Σ).
Table 2: GMM-HMM notation
Notation Explanation
T Length of the observation sequence
O Observation sequence, O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1
N Number of states in the model
M Number of Gaussian components
D Dimension of each observation
π Initial state distribution, 1×N
A State transition matrix, N×N
c Gaussian mixture weight at each state, N×M
µ Means of Gaussians at each state, N×M×D
Σ Covariance of Gaussian mixtures, N×M×D×D
Analogous to a discrete HMM, we can solve the same three problems with a GMM-HMM. How-
ever, the process used for training and scoring with a GMM-HMM differ significantly as compared
to a discrete HMM.
3.4 GMM-HMM Training and Scoring
To use a GMM-HMM to classify malware samples, we need to train a model, then use the resulting
model to score samples—see the discussion of problems 1 and 3 in Section 3.2, above. In this section,
we discuss scoring and training in the context of a GMM-HMM in some detail. We begin with the
simpler problem, which is scoring.
3.4.1 GMM-HMM Scoring
Given a GMM-HMM, which is defined by the 5-tuple of matrices λ = (A,π,c,µ,Σ), and a sequence
of observations O = {O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1}, we want to determine P(O |λ). The forward algorithm,
which is also known as the α-pass, can be used to efficiently compute P(O |λ).
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Analogous to a discrete HMM as discussed in (Stamp, 2018), in the α-pass of a GMM-HMM,
we define
αt(i) = P(O0,O1, . . . ,Ot ,xt = qi |λ),
that is, αt(i) is the probability of the partial sequence of observation up to time t, ending in state qi














At time t = 0, from the definition it is clear that we have α0(i) = πibi(O0).
In a discrete HMM, bi(Ot) gives the probability of observing Ot at time t when the underlying
Markov process is in state i. In a GMM-HMM, however, simply replacing bi(Ot) in (2) by the GMM
pdf corresponds to a point value of a continuous distribution. To obtain the desired probability, as






where θi consists of the parameters ci, µi and Σi of the GMM, and ε is a (small) range parameter.
3.4.2 GMM-HMM Training
The forward algorithm or α-pass calculates the probability of observing the sequence from the be-
ginning up to time t. There is an analogous backwards pass or β-pass that calculates the probability
of the tail of the sequence, that is, the sequence from t +1 to the end. In the β-pass, we define
βt(i) = P(Ot+1,Ot+2, . . . ,OT−1 |xi = qi,λ).





ai jb j(Ot)βt+1( j)
where we the initialization is βT−1(i) = 1, which follows from the definition.
In a discrete HMM, to re-estimate the state transitions in the A matrix, we first define
γt(i, j) = P(xt = qi,xt+1 = q j |O,λ)
which is the probability of being in state qi at time t and transiting to state q j at time t + 1. Using
the α-pass and the β-pass, we can efficiently compute γt(i, j); see (Stamp, 2018) for the details.
The sum of these “di-gamma” values with respect to the transiting states gives the probability of the
















To train a GMM-HMM, we use an analogous strategy as that used for the discrete HMM. The
GMM-HMM analog of the di-gamma form is
γt( j,k) = P(xt = q j |k,O,λ),
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where t = 0,1, . . . ,T−2, and j = 1,2, . . . ,N, and we have k = 1,2, . . . ,M. Here, γt( j,k) represents the
probability of being state q j at time t with respect to the kth Gaussian mixture. According to (Rabiner,












c jmN(Ot |µ jm,Σ jm)
where the αt( j) and βt( j) are defined above, and c jk is the weight of the kth Gaussian mixture
component.














for j = 1,2, . . . ,N and k = 1,2, . . . ,M; see (Juang, 1985) and (Rabiner, 1989) for additional details.
The numerator in (4) can be interpreted as the expected number of transitions from state q j as de-
termined by the kth Gaussian mixture while the denominator can viewed as the expected transitions






















for i = 1,2, . . . ,N and k = 1,2, . . . ,M.
3.5 GMM-HMM Example
As an example to illustrate a GMM-HMM, we train a model on English text, which is a classic
example for discrete HMMs (Cave and Neuwirth, 1980). With N = 2 hidden states and M = 27
observation symbols (corresponding the the 26 letters and word-space), a discrete HMM trained on
English text will have one hidden state corresponding to consonants, while the other hidden state
corresponds to vowels. That the model can make this key distinction is a good example of learning,
since a priori no information is provided regarding the differences between the observations. We
consider this same experiment using a GMM-HMM to see how this model compares to a discrete
HMM.
The English training data is from the “Brown corpus” (Brown Corpus of standard American
English, 1961), and we convert all letters to lowercase and remove punctuation, numbers, and other
special symbols, leaving only 26 letters and word-spaces. For our GMM-HMM training, we set N =
2, M = 6 (i.e., we have a mixture model consisting of 6 Gaussians) and T = 50000. The A matrix
is N×N, π is 1×N, both of which are row stochastic, and initialized to approximately uniform. The
parameter c represents the weights of the mixture components and is initialized with row stochastic
values, also approximately uniform. We use the global mean value (i.e., the mean of all observations)
and global variance to initialize µ and Σ. Note that each Gaussian is initialized with the same mean
and variance.
We train 100 of these GMM-HMM models, each with different random initializations. As the
observations are discrete symbols, the probability of each observation in state i at time t is estimated
by the probability density function. The best of the trained models clearly shows that the GMM-
HMM technique is able to successfully group the vowels into one state. This can be seen from
Figure 1. Note that in Figure 1, word-space is represented by the symbol “ ”.
6





























Figure 1: English letter distributions in each state
Table 3: Mean of each Gaussian mixture in each state
State Gaussian1 2 3 4 5 6
0 26.00 14.00 8.00 4.00 20.00 0.00
1 22.60 6.31 15.00 12.08 2.31 18.14
Figure 1 clearly shows that all vowels (and word space) belong to the first state. Table 3 lists
the mean value for each Gaussian mixture in the trained model. The mean value of each Gaussian
mixture component corresponds to the encoded value of each observation symbol.
In this example, since we know the number of vowels beforehand, we have set the number of
Gaussian mixture components to 6 (i.e., 5 vowels and word-space). In practice, we generally do not
know the true number of hidden states, in which case we would need to experiment with different
numbers of Gaussians. In general, machine learning and deep learning requires a significant degree
of experimentation, so it is not surprising that we might need to fine tune our models.
4 Malware Experiments
In this section, we fist introduce the dataset used in our experiments, followed by two distinct sets
of experiments. In our first set of experiments, we compare the performance of discrete HMMs and
GMM-HMMs using opcode sequences as our features. In our second set of experiments, we consider
entropy sequences, which serve to illustrate the strength of the GMM-HMM technique.
4.1 Dataset
In all of our experiments, we consider three malware families, namely, Winwebsec, Zbot, and Ze-
roaccess.
Winwebsec is a type of Trojan horse in the Windows operating system. It attempts to install mali-
cious programs by displaying fake links to bait users (Winwebsec, 2017).
Zbot is another type of Trojan that tries to steal user information by attaching executable files to
spam email messages (Zbot, 2017).
Zeroaccess also tries steal information, and it can also cause other malicious actions, such as down-
loading malware or opening a backdoor (Neville and Gibb, 2013).
Table 4 lists the number of samples of each malware family in our dataset. These families are
part of the Malicia dataset (Nappa et al., 2015) and have been used in numerous previous malware
studies.
The samples of each malware family are split into 80% for training and 20% for testing. We train
models on one malware family, and test the resulting model separately against the other two families.
Note that each of these experiments is a binary classification problem.
We use the area under the ROC curve (AUC) as our measure of success. The AUC can be
interpreted as the probability that a randomly selected positive sample scores higher than a randomly
7






Table 5: Percentage of top 30 opcodes




selected negative sample (Bradley, 1997). We perform 5-fold cross validation, and the average AUC
from the 5 folds is the numerical result that we use for comparison.
4.2 Opcode Features
For our first set of malware experiments, we compare a discrete HMM and GMM-HMM using
mnemonic opcode sequences as features. To encode the input, we disassemble each executable,
then extract the opcode sequence. We retain the most frequent 30 opcodes with all remaining op-
codes lumped together into a single “other” category, giving us a total of 31 distinct observations.
The percentage of opcodes that are among the top 30 most frequent are listed in Table 5.
For training, we limit the length of the observation sequence to T = 100000, and for the discrete
HMM, we let N = 2. For the GMM-HMM, we we experiment with the number of Gaussian mixtures
ranging from M = 2 to M = 5.
As mentioned above, we train a model with one malware family and test with the other two
malware families individually (i.e., in binary classification mode). To test each model’s performance,
we use one hundred samples from both families in the binary classification.
We initialize π and A to be approximately uniform, as well as making them row stochastic. For
each discrete HMM, the B matrix is initialize similarly, while for each GMM-HMM, the mean values
and the covariance are initialized with the global mean value and the global covariance of all training
samples.
Figure 2 gives the average AUC (over the 5 folds) for models trained with discrete HMMs and
the GMM-HMMs with different values for m, the number of Gaussians in the mixture. For most of
the models, the GMM-HMM is able to obtain comparable results to the discrete HMM, and it does
slightly outperform a discrete HMM in some cases. but the improvement is slight.
The results in Figure 2 indicate that for opcodes sequences, GMM-HMMs perform comparably
to discrete HMMs. However, GMM-HMMs are more complex and more challenging to train, and
the additional complexity does not appear to be warranted in this case. But, this is not surprising,
as opcode sequences are inherently discrete features. To obtain a more useful comparison, we next
consider GMM-HMMs trained on continuous features.
4.3 Entropy Features
GMM-HMMs are designed for continuous data, as opposed to discrete features, such as opcodes.
Thus to take full advantage of the GMM-HMM technique, we consider continuous entropy based
features.
We use a similar feature-extraction method as in (Baysa et al., 2013). Specifically, we consider
the raw bytes of an executable file, and we define a window size over which we compute the entropy.
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Test on Zbot Test on Zeroaccess

































Test on Zbot Test on Winwebsec



























Figure 2: Average AUC
Then we slide the window by a fixed amount and repeat the entropy calculation. Both the window
size and the slide amount are parameters that need to be tuned to obtain optimal performance. In
general, the slide will be smaller than the window size to ensure no information is lost.




where Wi is the ith window, and p(x) is the frequency of the occurrence of byte x within window Wi.
The entropy tends to be smoothed out with larger window sizes. We want to select a window size
sufficiently large so that we reduce noise, but not so large as to lose useful information. Examples of
entropy plots for different parameters are given in Figure 3.
Based on the results in (Baysa et al., 2013), we use half of the window size as the slide amount.
To select the best values for the parameters, we conduct experiments with the window and slide
combinations listed in Table 6. Also, as part of the parameter tuning process, we selected ε in (3) to
be 0.000001 for both Zbot and Zeroaccess, while we find 0.1 is optimal for Winwebsec.
For models trained on Zbot, the results of our experiments with the different window and slide
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(a) Window size = 512














(b) Window size = 128
Figure 3: Entropy plots
Table 6: Window size and slide amount
Window size 512 256 128
Slide 256 128 64
size pairings in Table 6 are given in Figure 4. The corresponding bar graphs for models trained on
Winwebsec and Zeroaccess are given in Figures 5 and 6, respectively, which can be found in the
Appendix. Note that we have experimented with the number of Gaussians in our mixture ranging
from m = 2 to m = 5. We see that a window size of size 512 performs the worst, while window
sizes of size 256 and 128 give improved results, with size 128 being slightly better than 256. The
optimal number of Gaussians depends on the families we are classifying. The results of analogous
experiments training models on Winwebsec and Zeroaccess are given in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.
In Table 7, we provide a direct comparison of discrete HMMs trained on opcodes to GMM-
HMM trained on opcodes and the best GMM-HMM models trained on entropy sequences. In every
case, the entropy-trained GMM-HMM outperforms the corresponding opcode based models. It is
also worth noting that computing an entropy sequence is more efficient than extracting mnemonic
opcodes. While it is costlier to train a GMM-HMM, the scoring cost is similar to a discrete HMM.
Since training is one-time work, efficiency considerations also favor entropy-based GMM-HMMs.
From Table 7 we see that GMM-HMMs trained on entropy perform dramatically better than
discrete HMMs, except in the two cases where models where Zbot and Zeroaccess are involved. To
gain further insight into these anomalous case, we use the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence (Joyce,
2011) to compare the probability distributions defined by of our trained GMM-HMM models. The
10
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(a) Window size = 512
Test on Winwebsec Test on Zeroaccess
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(b) Window size = 256
Test on Winwebsec Test on Zeroaccess
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(c) Window size = 128
Figure 4: Entropy vs window size for Zbot models
Table 7: Comparison of discrete HMM and GMM-HMM
Train Test Opcode Opcode EntropyHMM GMM-HMM GMM-HMM
Zbot Zeroaccess 0.87 0.90 0.94
Zbot Winwebsec 0.69 0.69 0.98
Zeroaccess Zbot 0.71 0.72 0.77
Zeroaccess Winwebsec 0.61 0.65 0.99
Winwebsec Zbot 0.72 0.66 1.00
Winwebsec Zeroaccess 0.83 0.83 1.00









where p and q are probability density functions. Note that the KL divergence in (5) is not symmetric,
and hence not a true distance measure. We compute a symmetric version of the divergence for





Using equation (6) we obtain the (symmetric) divergence results in Table 8. We see that the Zbot
and Zeroaccess models are much closer in terms of KL divergence, as compared to the other two
pairs. Thus we would expect GMM-HMM models to have more difficulty distinguishing these two
families from each other, as compared to the models generated for the other pairs of families.
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Curiously, the models trained on Zbot and tested on Zeroaccess perform well.1 Hence, a rela-
tively small KL divergence does not rule out the possibility that models can be useful, but intuitively,
a large divergence would seem to be an indicator of potentially challenging cases. This issue requires
further study.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have explored the usage of GMM-HMMs for malware classification, We compared
GMM-HMMs to discrete HMMs using opcode sequences, and we further experimented with en-
tropy sequences as features for GMM-HMMs. With the opcode sequence features, we were able
to obtained results with GMM-HMMs that are comparable to those obtained using discrete HMMs,
However, we expect GMM-HMMs to perform best on features that are naturally continuous, so we
also experimented with byte-based entropy sequences. In this latter set of experiments, the GMM-
HMM technique yielded stronger results than the discrete HMM in all cases—and in four of the six
cases, the improvement was large. We also directly compared the GMMs of our trained models using
KL divergence, which seems to provide insight into the most challenging cases.
For future work, more extensive experiments over larger numbers of families with larger numbers
of samples per family would be valuable. True multiclass experiments based on GMM-HMM scores
would also be of interest. Further analysis of the KL divergence of GMM-HMMs might provide
useful insights into these models.
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APPENDIX
Here, we bar graphs analogous to those in Figure 4 for models trained on Winwebsec and Zeroaccess.
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(c) Window size = 128
Figure 5: Entropy vs window size for Winwebsec models
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Figure 6: Entropy vs window size for Zeroaccess models
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